Oscar C. Fernandez vs Sps. Carlos and Narcisa Tarun

 GR No. 143868 November 14, 2002

Facts:

Brothers Antonio, Santiago, Demetria and Angel and their uncle Armando owned 1/6 of the fishpond. When Armando died, his share was distributed to others. Antonion sold his share to Tarun and the sales were registered and annotated. The co-owners of the fishpond executed an Extrajudicial deed of partition in exchange of the shares. The deed stipulated that the sale of the shares of demetria and antonio be recognised. When Tarun was already paying her realty taxes on their share of the fishpond, Angel and others were still in possession of the entire fishpond. Angel refused to the partition of the property.

Issue:

Whether or not the petitioners are entitled to exercise their right of legal redemption

Ruling:

No, the petitioners are not entitled to exercise their right of legal redemption. The right to redeemonly applies when a portion is sold to a non-co-owner. Tarun became a co owner of the fishpond because they were sold shares of it by Demetria and Antionio before Tarun succeeded angel. Legal redemption is in the nature of a privilege created by law partly for reasons of public policy and partly for the benefit and convenience of the redemptioner, to afford him a way out of what might be a disagreeable or inconvenient association into which he has beenthrust. The petitioner’s contention that the sales of the shares in the disputed fishpond to the respondents are void because a notice in writing to the other co-owners wasnot sent as required under Article 1625  of the Civil Code is not meritorious. The provision only states that thedeed of sale shall not be recorded in the registry of property without such notice but it does not make the sale void.

Ting Ho vs Teng Gui

 GR No. 130115 July 16, 2008

Facts:

Felix Ting Ho, Jr., Merla Ting Ho Braden, Juana Ting Ho and Lydia Ting Ho Belenzo against their brother, respondent Vicente Teng Gui.   The controversy revolves around a parcel of land, and the improvements which should form part of the estate of their deceased father, Felix Ting Ho, and should be partitioned equally among each of the siblings. Petitioners alleged that their father Felix Ting Ho died intestate on June 26, 1970, and left upon his death an estate. According to petitioners, the said lot and properties were titled and tax declared under trust in the name of respondent Vicente Teng Gui for the benefit of the deceased Felix Ting Ho who, being a Chinese citizen, was then disqualified to own public lands in thePhilippines; and that upon the death of Felix Ting Ho, the respondent took possession of the same for his own exclusive use and benefit to their exclusion and prejudice.



Issue:
Whether or not the sale was void



Ruling:
No, the sale was not void. Article 1471 of the Civil Code has provided that if the price is simulated, the sale is void, but the act may be shown to have been in reality a donatin, or some other act or contract. The sale in this case, was however valid because the sale was in fact a donation. The law requires positive proof of the simulation of the price of the sale. But since the finding was based on a mere assumption, the price has not been proven to be a simulation.

Mapalo vs Mapalo

 GR No. 21489 &21623 May 19, 1966

Facts:

Magpalo and Quiba are farmers who are the registered owners of a residential land. Magpalo decided to donate the eastern half of his land to Maximo. However, Magpalo and Quiba were deceived into signing a deed of absolute sale of the entire land. The document showed a consideration of P500 but Magpalo contended that he was not able to receive anything. Magpalo built a fence to segregate the donated land. Maximo registered the deed of sale in his favor and was able to obtain a TCT. Maximo then sold the entire land to Narciso. Narciso took possession of the eastern part of the land.



Issue:
Whether or not the contract is voidable



Ruling:



No, the contract is not voidable but void. The contract of purchase and sale is null and void and produces no effect whatsoever where the same is without cause or consideration in that purchase price which appears thereon as paid, has in fact never been paid by the purchaser or the vendor.

Penalosa vs Santos

 363 SCRA 545, GR No. 133749 August 23, 2001

Facts:

Penalosa entered into 2 contracts of sale with Santos. The contract is a conditional contract of sale. According to the stipulations of the contract, Penalosa would have to evict the illegal settlers in the lot afterwhich, the sale will be formalised. However, Penalosa failed to pay the purchase price. Santos contends that the contracts are absolutely simulated and therefore, void.



Issue:
Whether or not the contract of sale was absolutely simulated for want of consideration



Ruling;
No, the contract of sale was not simulated. The contracts were perfected and the entire requirement for the perfection of a contract of sale were satisfied. The meeting of the minds of Santos and Penalosa perfected the contract despite the failure of Penalosa to pay the purchase price.

Mccullough vs Aenille & Co.

13 hil. 285 February 3, 1904

Facts:

Furniture and tobacoo were being sold by Aenille and Co. The furniture was sold at 90% of the price that is shown in a subsequent inventory. The tobacco was sold with the price indicated in the invoice.

Issue:

Whether or not the price is already considered certain

Ruling:

Yes, the price is already considered certain. A written agreement by which one party buys and the other sells can be made certain by reference to certain invoices in existence and identified by the agreement. The contract of sale is therefore completed.

Toyota Shaw vs CA

 GR No. 116650 May 23, 1995

Facts:

Sosa wanted to purchase a Toyota Car. She met Bernardo, the sales representative of Toyota. Sosa emphasized to the sales rep that she needed the car not later than 17 June 1989. They contracted an agreement on the delivery of the unit and that the balance of the purchase price would be paid by credit financing. The following day, Sosa delivered the downpayment and a Vehicle sales proposal was printed. On the day of delivery, Bernardo called Sosa to inform him that the car could not be delivered. Toyota contends, on the other hand, that the Lite Ace was not delivered to Sosa because of the disapproval by B.A. Finance of the credit financing application of Sosa. Toyota then gave Sosa the option to purchase the unit by paying the full purchase price in cash but Sosa refused. Sosa asked that his down payment be refunded. Toyota did so on the very same day by issuing a Far East Bank check for the full amount, which Sosa signed with the reservation, “without prejudice to our future claims for damages.” Thereafter, Sosa sent two letters to Toyota. In the first letter, she demanded the refund of the down payment plus interest from the time she paid it and for damages. Toyota refused to the demands of Sosa.

Issue:

Whether or not there was a perfected contract of sale

Ruling:

What is clear from the agreement signed by Sosa and Gilbert is not a contract of sale. No obligation on the part of Toyota to transfer ownership of the car to Sosa and no correlative obligation on the part of Sosa to pay . The provision on the down payment of PIOO,OOO.OO made no specific reference to a sale of a vehicle. If it was intended for a contract of sale, it could only refer to a sale on installment basis, as the VSP executed the following day. Nothing was mentioned about the full purchase price and the manner the installments were to be paid. An agreement on the manner of payment of the price is an essential element in the formation of a binding and enforceable contract of sale. This is so because the agreement as to the manner of payment goes, into the price such that a disagreement on the manner of payment is tantamount to a failure to agree on the price. Definiteness as to the price is an essential element of a binding agreement to sell personal property.

Sps. Bernardo Buenaventora and consolacion Joaquin, et. al vs Court of Appeals, et. al

GR No. 126376 November 20, 2003

Facts:

Joaquin and Landrito are the parents of the plaintiffs and the defendants. They would like to be declared null and void ab initio certain deeds of sale of real property executed by Joaquin and landrito in favor of their co-defendants. Petitioners aver that the deeds are simulated and therefore null and void ab initio because firstly, there was no actual valid consideration for the deeds of sale over the properties, secondly, assuming that there was consideration in the sumsr eflected in the questioned deeds, the properties are more than three-fold times more valuable than the measly sums appearing therein, thirdly, the deeds of sale do not reflect and express the true intent of the parties (vendors and vendees), fourthly, the purported sale of the properties in litis was the result of a deliberate conspiracy designed to unjustly deprive the rest of the compulsory heirsof their legitime.

Issue:

Whether or not the Deeds of sale are void for lack of consideration



Ruling:
No, the deeds of sale are not void for lack of consideration. A contract of sale is not a real contract, but a consensual contract. As a consensual contract, a contract of sale becomes a binding and valid contract upon the meeting of the minds as to price. If there is a meeting of the minds of the parties as to the price, the contract of sale is valid, despite the manner of payment, or even the breach of that manner of payment. If the real price is not stated in the contract, then the contract of sale is valid but subject to reformation. If there is no meeting of the minds of the parties as to the price, because the price stipulated in the contract is simulated, then the contract is void. Article 1471 of the Civil Code states that if the price in a contract of sale is simulated, the sale is void. It is not the act of payment of price that determines the validity of a contract of sale. Payment of the price has nothing to do with the perfection of the contract. Payment of the price goes into the performance of the contract. Failure to pay the consideration is different from lack of consideration.The former results in a right to demand the fulfillment or cancellation of the obligation under an existing valid contract while the latter prevents the existence of a valid contract.

De Leon vs Ong

 GR No. 170405 February 2, 2010

Facts:

De Leon sold 3 parcels of land to Ong. The properties were mortgaged to Real Savings and Loan Association. The parties executed a notarized deed of absolute sale with assumption of mortgage. The deed of Assumption of mortgage shall be executed in favor of Ong after the payment of 415K. Ong complied with it. De Leon handed the keys of to Ong and informed the loan company that the mortgage has been assumed by Ong. Ong made some improvements in the property. After sometime, Ong learned that the properties were sold to Viloria and changed the locks to it. Ong went to the mortgage company and learned that the mortgage was already paid and the titles were given to Viloria. Ong filed a complaint for the nullity of second sale and damages. De Leon contended that Ong does not have a cause of action against him because the sale was subject to a condition which requires the approval of the loan company and that he and Ong only entered a contract to sell.

Issue:

Whether or not the parties entered into a contract of sale

Ruling:

Yes, the parties entered into a contract of sale. In a contract of sale, the seller conveys ownership of the property to the buyer upon the perfection of the contract. The non-payment of the price is a negative resolutory condition. Contract to sell is subject to a positive suspensive condition. The buyer does not acquire ownership of the property until he fully pays the purchase price. In the present case, the deed executed by the parties did not show that the owner intends to reserve ownership of the properties. The terms and conditions affected only the manner of  payment and not the immediate transfer of ownership. It was clear that the owner intended a sale because he unqualifiedly delivered and transferred ownership of the properties to the respondent

Movido vs Pastor

 GR No. 172279 February 11, 2010

Facts:

Pastor alleged that he and Movido executed a contract to sell where Movido agreed to sell a parcel of his land in Cavite. Pastor also alleged that the contract provided that if a Napocor power line transvered the subject lot, the purchase price would be lowered. He also claimed that Movido undertook the cause of the survey of the property in order to determine the portion affected by the Napocor power line. The petitioner also alleged that he already paid more than half of the price and that he was willing and ready to pay the balance of the purchase price but due to petitioner’s refusal to have the property surveyed despite incessant demands, his unpaid balance could not be determined with certainty. Movido alleged that there original negotiation for the sale of his property involved a smaller lot area and that Pastor was in delay in paying several installments and that this is a material breach because they agreed that the survery of the property would only be done after Pastor would have paid the 7^th installment.

Issue:

Whether or not the validity of a contract will depend on certain stipulations in it

Ruling:

No, the validity of a contract will not depend on certain stipulations in it. In this case, the 2 contracts that were executed by the parties would reveal that the payment of the purchase price does not depend on the survey of the property. In other words, the purchase price should be paid whether or not the property is surveyed. The survey of the property is important only insofar as the right of respondent to the reduction of the purchase price is concerned. On the other hand, the survey of the property to determine the metes and bounds of the 1,731 sq. m. portion that is excluded from the contract as well as the portions covered by the kasunduan which will be subject to reduction of the purchase price, is also not conditioned on the payment of any installment.

Celestino vs CIR

 99 Phil. 841 August 31, 1956

Facts:

Celestino is the owner of Oriental Sash Factory. It paid 7% on the gross sales of their sales. In 1952, they began to pay only 3% tax. Petitioner claims that it does not manufacture ready-made doors, sash and windows for the public, but only upon special orders from the customers, hence, it is not engaged in manufacturing under sec 186, but only in sales of services covered by sec 191. Having failed to convince BIR, petitioner went to the Court of Tax Appeal where it also failed. CTA, in its decision, holds that the “petitioner has chosen for its tradename and has offered itself to the public as a “Factory”, which means it is out to do business, in its chosen lines on a big scale. As a general rule, sash factories receive orders for doors and windows of special design only in particular cases but the bulk of their sales is derived from a ready-made doors and windows of standard sizes for the average home.

Issue:

Whether the petitioner company provides special services or is engaged in manufacturing.

Ruling:

The Oriental Sash Factory is engaged in manufacturing. The company habitually makes sash, windows and doors as it has been represented to the public.The fact that windows and doors are made by it only when customers place their orders, does not alter the nature of the establishment, for it is obvious that it only accepted such orders as called for the employment of such material-moulding, frames, panels-as it ordinarily manufactured or was in a position habitually to manufacture. The Oriental Sash Factory does nothing more than sell the goods that it mass-produces or habitually makes; sash, panels, mouldings, frames, cutting them to such sizes and combining them in such forms as its customers may desire.

Inchausti vs Cromwell

 20 Phil. 345 October 16, 1911

Facts:

Inchausti is engaged in the business of buying and selling wholesale hemp on commission. It is customary to sell hemp in bales which are made by compressing the loose fiber by means of presses, covering two sides of the bale with matting, and fastening it by means of strips of rattan; that the operation of bailing hemp is designated among merchants by the word “prensaje.” In all sales of hemp by Inchausti, the price is quoted to the buyer at so much per picul, no mention being made of bailing. It is with the tacit understanding that the hemp will be delivered in bales. The amount depends under the denomination of “prensaje” or the baled hemp. CIR made demand in writing upon Inchausti for the payment of the sum of P1,370.68 as a tax of one third of one per cent on the sums of money mentioned as aggreagate sum collected as prensaje or the baled hemp. Inchausti paid upon protest, contending that the collected amount is illegal upon the ground that the said charge does not constitute a part of the selling price of the hemp, but is a charge made for the service of baling the hemp.

Issue:

Whether or not the baled hemp constitutes a contract of sale

Ruling:

Yes, the baled hemp constitutes a contract of sale. In the case at bar, the baled form before the agreement of sale were made and would have been in existence even if none of the individual sales in question had been consummated. The hemp, even if sold to someone else, will be sold in bales. When a person stipulates for the future sale of articles which he is habitually making, and which at the time are not made or finished, it is essentially a contract of sale and not a contract for piece of work. It is otherwise when the article is made pursuant to agreement. If the article ordered by the purchaser is exactly such as the plaintiff makes and keeps on hand for sale to anyone, and no change or modification of it is made at the defendant’s request, it is a contract of sale, even though it may be entirely made after, and in consequence of, the defendant’s order for it.

Ker and Co., LTD vs Lingad

 GR No. L-20871 April 30, 1971

Facts:

CIR assessed the sum of P20,272.33 as the commercial broker’s percentage tax, surcharge, and compromise penalty against Ker & Co. Ker and Co. requested for the cancellation of the assessment and filed a petition for review with the Court of Tax Appeals. The CTA ruled that Ker and Co is liable as a commercial broker. Ker has a contract with US rubber. Ker is the distributor of the said company. Ker was precluded from disposing the products elsewhere unless there has been a written consent from the company. The prices, discounts, terms of payment, terms of delivery and other conditions of sale were subject to change in the discretion of the Company.

Issue:

Whether the relationship of Ker and Co and US rubber was that of a vendor- vendee or principal-broker

Ruling:

The relationship of Ker and Co and US rubber was that of a principal-broker/ agency. Ker and Co is only an agent of the US rubber because it can dispose of the products of the Company only to certain persons or entities and within stipulated limits, unless excepted by the contract or by the Rubber Company, it merely receives, accepts and/or holds upon consignment the products, which remain properties of the latter company, every effort shall be made by petitioner to promote in every way the sale of the products and that sales made by petitioner are subject to approval by the company. Since the company retained ownership of the goods, even as it delivered possession unto the dealer for resale to customers, the price and terms of which were subject to the company’s control, the relationship between the company and the dealer is one of agency.

German Management Services vs. CA

German Management Services vs. CA, GR No. 76217 September 14, 1989

Facts:

Spouses Jose are the owners of a parcel of land in Antipolo. They executed a special power of attorney authorizing German management Services to develop their property into a residential subdivision. However, the property was being occupied by private respondents and twenty other persons. They were asked to vacate but refused. PR filed an action for forcible entry and alleged that they are mountainside farmers of the area and have occupied and tilled their farmholdings prior to the promulgation of PD 27. They stated that they have been deprived of their property without due process of law by means of force, violence and intimidation.

Issue:

Whether or not petitioner forcibly entered the property of the PR ( I know this is RPC- but involved and prop)

Ruling:

Yes, the petitioner forcibly entered the property of the PR. In forcible entry, ownership is not an issue. It may be a fact that the German Management was duly authorised by the owners to develop the subject property, the actual possessors of the land, the Prs, can commence a forcible entry case against the petitioner. Forcible entry is merely a quieting process and never determines the actual title to an estate. 

Spouses Custodio vs. CA

Spouses Custodio vs. CA, GR No. 116100 February 9, 1996

Facts:

Mabasa owns a parcel of land with a 2 door apartment. The property is surrounded by other immovables. When Mabasa bought the land, there were tenants who were occupying the property. One of the tenants vacated the land. Mabasa saw that thhere had been built an adobe fence in the apartment in the first passageway that made it narrower. The fence was constructed by the Santoses. Morato constructed her fence and extended it to the entire passageway, therefore, the passageay was enclosed. The case was broguth to the trial court and ordered the custodios and the Santoses to give Mabasa a permanet ingress and eggress to the punlic street and asked Mabasa to pay Custodios and Santoses for damages.

Issue:

Whether or not Mabasa has the right to demand for a right of way

Ruling:

Yes, Mabasa has the right to demand for a right of way. A person has a right to the natural use and enjoyment of his own property, according to his pleasure, for all the purposes to which such property is usually applied. As a general rule, therefore, there is no cause of action for acts done by one person upon his own property in a lawful and proper manner, although such acts incidentally cause damage or an unavoidable loss to another, as such damage or loss is damnum absque injuria. When the owner of property makes use thereof in the general and ordinary manner in which the property is used, such as fencing or enclosing the same as in this case, nobody can complain of having been injured, because the inconvenience arising from said use can be considered as a mere consequence of community life

City Government of Quezon vs. Judge Ericta

City Government of Quezon vs. Judge Ericta GR No. L-34915 June 24, 1983

Facts:

An ordinance was promulgated in Quezon city which approved the the regulation ofestablishment of private cemeteries in the said city. According to the ordinance, 6% of the total area of the private memorial park shall be set aside for charity burial of deceased persons who are paupers and have been residents of QC. Himlayang Pilipino, a private memorial park, contends that the taking or confiscation of property restricts the use of property such that it cannot be used for any reasonable purpose and deprives the owner of all beneficial use of his property. It also contends that the taking is not a valid exercise of police power, since the properties taken in the exercise of police power are destroyed and not for the benefit of the public.

Issue:

Whether or not the ordinance made by Quezon City is a valid taking of private property

Ruling:

No, the ordinance made by Quezon City is not a valid way of taking private property. The ordinace is actually a taking without compensation of a certain area from a private cemetery to benefit paupers who are charges of the municipal corporation. Instead of building or maintaing a public cemeteries. State's exercise of the power of expropriation requires payment of just compensation. Passing the ordinance without benefiting the owner of the property with just compensation or due process, would amount to unjust taking of a real property. Since the property that is needed to be taken will be used for the public's benefit, then the power of the state to expropriate will come forward and not the police power of the state.

Ancheta vs. Guersey-Dalaygon

Ancheta vs. Guersey-Dalaygon, GR No. 139868 June 8, 2006

Facts:

2 American citizens have resided in the Philippines. They have an adopted daughter. The wife died and left a will where she left her entire estate to her husband. 2 years after the wife's death, the husband married a Candelaria. 4 years after, Richard died and left a will where he left his entire estate to Candelaria except for some of his shares in a company which he left to his adopted daughter. Audrey’s will was admitted to probate in CFI Rizal. Inventory was taken on their conjugal properties. Ancheta, as the administrator, filed for a partition of the first wife's estate. The will was also admitted in a court in her native land (Maryland).

Issue: Whether or not the properties in issue should be governed by the law where the property is situated

Ruling:

Yes, properties in issue should be governed by the law where the property is situated. However, since the first wife is a foreign national, the intrinsic validity of her will is governed by her national law. The national law of the person who made the will shall regulate whose succession is in consideration whatever the nature of the property and regardless of the country where the property maybe found (Art 16 CC). The first wife's properties may be found in the Philipppines, however the successional rights over those properties are governed by the national law of the testator.

Faustino Ignacio vs Director of Lands

Facts:

Ignacio applied for the registration of a parcel of a mangrove land in Rizal. It was stated in the application that he owned the parcelby right of accretion. The director of land opposed the registration for the reason that the land to be registered is an area of public domain and that the applicant nor his predecessor-in-interes possessed sufficient title for the land. The parcel of land appliedwas acquired from the government by the virtue of a free patent title. However, the land in question was formed by accretion and alluvial deposists caused by the action of the Manila bay. The petition was denied by the lower court and decided that the land to be registered are part of the public domain. Faustino, however, contended that the court could have declared the land not to be part of the public domain.

Issue:

Whether or not the courts have the power to reclassify a land

Ruling:

No, the courts do not have the power to reclassify a land. The courts are primarily called upon to determine whether a land is to be used for public purpose. However, it is only limited there. A formal declaration of reclassification of land should come from the government, specifically from the executive department or the legislature. These bodies should declare that a land in question is no longer needed for public use, some public use or for the improvement of national wealth.